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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-2583

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHIAMAKA WILLIFORD

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 03-cr-00566)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 26, 2006
Before: RENDELL and SMITH, Circuit Judges
and IRENAS*, District Judge.
(Filed: February 14, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Chiamaka Williford raises a challenge based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

* Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting
by designation.

220 (2005), to the sentence he received following his guilty plea to charges of
distributing crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
860(a). He was sentenced to forty-six months in prison, followed by six years of
supervised release. Williford argues that his sentence should be vacated under Booker
because the District Court erroneously treated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as
mandatory rather than advisory. See United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 164 (3d Cir.
2005) (en banc).
This case is controlled by our decision in United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207
(3d Cir. 2005), in which we held that “where a criminal defendant has voluntarily and
knowingly entered into a plea agreement in which he or she waives the right to appeal,
the defendant is not entitled to resentencing in light of Booker.” Id. at 214. In his plea
agreement, Williford “voluntarily and expressly waive[d] all rights to appeal or
collaterally attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this
prosecution.” (Plea Agmt. ¶ 7 at App. 59.) The only exceptions to this waiver were for
an appeal based on a claim that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or that the
sentencing judge erroneously departed upward from the guidelines range. This waiver is
almost identical to the one at issue in Lockett. Because Williford does not contest his
sentence on one of the enumerated exceptions, we will dismiss his appeal as inconsistent
with the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. Lockett, 406 F.3d at 214.
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